That, and the fact that in a pinch I can use it on someone else's computer if I need to. If I trust that person and re-skim through the source to verify that it's not phishing, it's equally easy to use on any machine running Firefox (since that particular implementation is, unfortunately, browser specific).TheGrammarBolshevik wrote:What's the advantage of this over KeePass? Easier to audit the code?
That is the advice because 1) you can fit more entropy into fewer characters that way, and some sites limit the size of the password you can use, and 2) it is unlikely that a person allowed to choose their own words will pick something with sufficiently high entropy, because we're bad and randomness.Vash wrote:The main problem is that the comparison is wrong. It is much better if your password is not a word. That is what the strictest security advice suggests.
In any case, correcthorsebatterystaple is *not* a word. It's four of them, chosen randomly. Which means that the total entropy is four times the entropy of each individual word.
The "logic" people keep using to criticize Randall's suggestion as being vulnerable to a dictionary attack is just as ridiculous as the following:
Your password obviously should not be just a 1 or a 0, as those passwords are stupidly easy to break. Therefore, your password should not consist of a concatenated string of random choices (with replacement) from the set {0,1}.
True. But of course if you'd read even just the most recent page or so of this thread, you'd see that the estimate wasn't intended for the scenario where you have your own machine on which to brute force a password at your leisure.1,000 guesses per second is also a drastic underestimate when pretty much anyone can easily buy the hardware and software to do almost 3,000,000 guesses per second.
